Cognitive superiority can be seen as one of the decisive goals of modern information and cyber warfare, relying on access to information, pervasive surveillance, personalized persuasion, and new technologies. Cognitive superiority is nothing new – but its role for the other domains of societal activity should be more systematically assessed. Hence, we must start to think about the broad field of hybrid threats in a more sophisticated way.

Cyberspace has facilitated the creation of a vitreous human and – potentially – transparent society. Digitalization and its common use made the virtual Cyberspace a real place, a diplomatic tool, an economic factor, a military effector, and a social space, satisfying, amongst others, especially human needs for connectivity. It has democratized information access, but Cyberspace as an so far unlimited and boundless space/domain has “harmed” the Westphalian paradigm of the state as the guardian of sovereignty, by so far overwriting the state’s monopoly of (physical) power with new forms of violence. Malign actors have gotten direct access to influence almost every target audience, setting, undermining, or dominating narratives.

One of the biggest “hybrid” threats in the upcoming years will be malign actors’ activities influencing the “Western” cognitive domain by undermining Western core values, such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and adherence to human rights. We are facing already a “cognitive” fight for narratives through the Cyberspace, aiming to dominate the cognitive domain and to gain cognitive advantage.

The panel will deal with the following questions:

 Cognitive warfare and superiority: The primary goal of cognitive warfare lies in gaining cognitive superiority, which relies on access to information, pervasive surveillance, personalized persuasion, and new technologies.

 Authoritarian strategic culture and digital tools: Authoritarian states, revisionist powers, rogue states, and non-state networks leverage authoritarian strategic culture thinking. They combine this mindset with digital tools enabled by new platforms, networks, and speed. The need for new regulations in this context was also emphasized.

 Cognitive warfare and superiority: The primary goal of cognitive warfare lies in gaining cognitive superiority, which relies on access to information, pervasive surveillance, personalized persuasion, and new technologies.

 Authoritarian strategic culture and digital tools: Authoritarian states, revisionist powers, rogue states, and non-state networks leverage authoritarian strategic culture thinking. They combine this mindset with digital tools enabled by new platforms, networks, and speed. The need for new regulations in this context was also emphasized.

What happens in the Indo-Pacific affects NATO and vice-versa. This panel will consider how NATO can develop and deepen cooperation with partners in Asia to address cross-cutting security issues and global challenges, including cooperative cyber defence.

The panel ”AI in Adversarial Influence: Weaponising Perception and Reality Manipulation” will explore the evolving landscape of information warfare, focusing on the intersection of artificial intelligence and social media manipulation. The discussion will draw from extensive research on Russian and Chinese influence operations and the impact of EU sanctions. The panel will investigate the role of generative AI in both propagandist and defensive capacities, examining the benefits and risks associated with AI-powered tools in targeted digital persuasion campaigns. Additionally, we aim to highlight the use of advanced AI technology in identifying and countering hostile influence operations across various geopolitical contexts, including the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.Finally, experts will conclude the discussion with the current capabilities of social media platforms to detect and counter automated commercial manipulations.

Amid escalating geopolitical tensions, the potential crisis surrounding Taiwan has become an extremely critical concern for global security. Taiwan, due to its geographical location, economic significance, and military strategic importance, is a region of immense value to the international community. Should a crisis arise in Taiwan, its impact is expected to extend beyond Taiwan itself, affecting neighboring regions and potentially even broader areas. The effects on critical infrastructure are particularly severe and undeniable.

As Taiwan’s strategic importance grows, the increasing tensions surrounding it pose significant risks for neighboring countries and the international community as a whole. Taiwan is a leading hub for semiconductor manufacturing, and its economic role is indispensable to the global supply chain. Consequently, a potential crisis in Taiwan would not only destabilize regional security but also have profound implications for the international economy and technological innovation.

In light of this context, our session will engage with experts from various countries to discuss preparedness and response strategies for scenarios involving a Taiwan crisis. The focus will be on cyber defense and critical infrastructure protection, examining how to prepare for and respond to such a crisis. By gathering insights from experts, we aim to develop practical and actionable measures to enhance preparedness for future risks.

The 2021 Colonial Gas Pipeline ransomware attack in the United States demonstrated that the cybersecurity of critical energy infrastructure is of global concern. As more countries shift to green and renewable energy sources, partly in response to oil and gas concerns surrounding the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, and partly to commitments to uphold climate change agreements, we can be certain that adversarial nation states and criminals will seek opportunities to disrupt international order by increasing cyber attacks on the energy sector.

Our CYDEF panel includes experts who are seeking solutions to the threat of cyber attack on energy infrastructure. We will explore how nations within the Indo-Pacific region are preparing for and securing their national and shared energy resources, including operational control systems, renewable energy generation, electrical grids, battery storage, or gas/oil storage and transfer.

The cargo ship Dali crashed into the Francis Scott Key Bridge shutting down the port of Baltimore and closing a major shipping lane or more than two months. Failure of the electrical system after escorting tugs had released the cargo ship made it the perfect scenario to impact the supply chain. As our shipping becomes more “fly by wire” the opportunity for malicious failures are more prevalent. In addition, unauthorized surveillance devices found on cranes operating in ports equipped with cellular modems that appear to be backdoor for remote access have been found suggesting preparation of the battlefield for future attacks. These are the entry points to the national logistics systems with similar issues found in each segment of the logistics chain.

This session will explore the topics of logistics based critical infrastructure resilience understanding threat vectors, civil-military cooperation, the emergence of regulatory frameworks, the application of technology solutions and best practices. Transportation and logistics are essential for the operation of the highly inter-connected commerce across multiple countries and can be disrupted impacting food and energy security as well as continued operation of manufacturing. Technology is connecting operational systems through satellite systems allowing for remote manipulation.

The session provides an opportunity to discuss the current state and engage the audience in innovative solutions and cooperative efforts that could be implemented. The goal is to foster a dialogue between cybersecurity experts, policymakers, and military strategists to develop more resilient infrastructure protection strategies.

Satellite communications (SATCOM) are a significant aspect of national security and play a pivotal role in connecting society. They underpin critical infrastructure and modern economic activity and are a crucial point of multi-domain advantage or vulnerability. Financial trading, for example, increasingly leverages SATCOM connectivity through very small aperture terminals (VSATs), and there are diverse military dependencies including for command and control (C2). The societal, economic, and strategic significance of SATCOM makes it a target for adversaries.

Cyber-attacks are a vector by which adversaries seek to target and impact SATCOM. The February 2022 cyber-attack on ViaSat, attributed to Russia, is a prominent case of this but it is not an isolated incident. Cyber threat actors have targeted SATCOM to gather intelligence, achieve access, and create destructive effects among other objectives. As SATCOM is commercialised, cyber-attacks increasingly target private companies many of whom have insufficient incentives or abilities to prioritise cyber security. SATCOM has limited regulation, complex supply chains, few cyber security personnel, and faces unique trade-offs in security vs functionality. Cyber capabilities targeting satellite systems have proliferated over the last 20 years, with around 30 countries now possessing cyber counterspace capabilities. Moreover, countries that lack sophisticated SATCOM are incentivised to offset their disadvantage by disrupting other’s capabilities. There is a clear need to assess and improve SATCOM cyber security and resilience.

Threats to the Financial system have evolved to, in many cases, form part of the broader Hybrid Warfare and Threats spectrum. As such the cover both “soft threats” as well as “hard threats” and span many Hybrid Threats areas. This involves the use of integrated, targeted and dynamically composed and selected tools to achieve a specific aim in the financial sector, including hard critical infrastructure, financial markets operations, disinformation and others.

The key soft threat, is the use of Integrated tools that include not only the use of illegal and illegitimate means to acquire companies and assets in the critical, dual and strategic sectors, but in many cases the use of quite legitimate and legal financial market operations to achieve those aims. The critical importance of countering such operations in the Hybrid Threats spectrum have become essential as national security, military superiority and financial security have become intertwined through innovation and intellectual property (IP). The acquisition of critical and dual use technologies through financial markets operations have become a key tool in the strategic power competition.

In the hard threats spectrum, the protection of the integrity of the infrastructure of the financial system has become paramount. This includes Sub sea date cables used for financial transactions, Sattelite communication functions and vulnerability to electro magnetic attacks, including GPS and time keeping, Cyber security and the protection of the integrity of AI data, and Continued electricity provisions.

Another key element is the Protection of the integrity of the payment and Clearing systems, ensuring continuity after an attack. This should also include the necessary emergency laws.

Integrated and targeted hybrid attacks combining several tools (financial markets operations, social media, cyber attacks, Disinformation, DeepFakes) is another soft threat that could underline civil order, stock market operations, companies functioning normally, retail bank operations and others.

If the economy is the body of society, finance is the blood that keeps it alive. Hybrid Warfarebtherfure does not just target economic security through undermining for example supply chains, raw materials sourcing and the like. It also targets the blood that flows through the economic body: finance. It is therefore essential to consider the threats to the financial system separately from federal economic security and to deal with those threats not as general regulatory or legal challenges, but as national security threats.